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Abstract New Zealand’s approach to marine
biosecurity has been to integrate the pre-border,
border, and post-border management actions so as
to appropriately and effectively utilise resources.
Prevention is clearly better than cure, consequently
pre-border and border management is paramount.
There is, however, recognition that quarantine style
controls result in leaky borders. Early detection of
new invaders, coupled with appropriate incursion
response protocols and tools, increases the likelihood
that a response will: (1) be effective; and (2) cause
less collateral damage. Rapid response plans for pre-
defined, high-risk species allow an adaptive and tar-
geted approach. The selected species are also the
object of targeted surveillance in high incursion risk
points of first entry into the New Zealand coastal
environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Non-indigenous species continue to invade marine
ecosystems around the world at an increasing rate
(e.g., Cohen & Carlton 1998; Thresher et al. 1999;
Hewitt 2003). These invasions can adversely affect
natural ecosystems, commerce, and human health
(Ruiz et al. 1997). As an isolated island nation, New
Zealand possesses both unique biodiversity and the
opportunity to protect it. Biosecurity is the manage-
ment of risks from non-indigenous species
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment
2000). Prevention, early detection, and rapid
response are all essential components of an effective
biosecurity system (Meyerson & Reaser 2002;
Hewitt et al. 2004).
Control or eradication of invasive species is
technically and financially difficult (Meyerson &
Reaser 2002), particularly in the marine environ-
ment. The most effective management strategy is to
reduce the risk of introductions. Consequently, pre-
border and border control measures are paramount
(Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment
2000; Bax et al. 2001). However, with the continued
movement of craft, people, and goods, some
incursions are inevitable. Post-border management
systems need to be in place to prepare for and
provide an appropriate response to incursions when
(not if) they happen (Parliamentary Commissioner
for the Environment 2000).
Early detection of new invaders increases the
likelihood that a response will be effective and cause
less collateral damage (see Myers et al. 2000; Bax
et al. 2001). Appropriate surveillance programmes
should be established that target the highest risk
pathways, species, and sites. Surveillance efforts
need to be coupled with incursion response systems,
which will enable rapid and effective response to
new introductions.
An effective response system consists of three
main components: (1) processes and plans to guide
response actions; (2) tools with which to respond;
and (3) the capability and resources to carry out the
response. A fourth component is the management of
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sustained political and public will. This paper
outlines the New Zealand government’s marine
biosecurity incursion response processes in relation
to the first component.
GENERIC INCURSION
RESPONSE PROTOCOL
The Ministry of Fisheries developed a generic
incursion response protocol for marine biosecurity
to guide decision-making during a response. The
protocol will also ensure that decisions are
transparent, consistent, and well documented. This
protocol is based on the Biosecurity Council Policy
Statement on Responding to an Exotic Organism
Incursion (Biosecurity Council 2001). The
Biosecurity Act 1993 provides the legal basis for
incursion response in New Zealand. The Chief
Technical Officer for Marine Biosecurity (CTO-
MB)—a statutory position appointed under the
Biosecurity Act—is responsible for managing any
response.
The Ministry of Fisheries developed a decision
tree outlining the key steps in the decision-making
process during an incursion response (Fig. 1). Our
decision tree differs somewhat from that of Bax et
al. (2001), which was proposed for controlling
already established invasive species, not new
incursions. Long-term management has the relative
luxury of time to conduct in-depth research, in
contrast to incursion response where a successful
outcome may hinge on a rapid response. During an
incursion there may not be the time or the need for
detailed research (Simberloff 2003). Although the
decision tree shows activities occurring in sequence,
in reality some activities will often occur simul-
taneously. The following section discusses the main
stages of an initial response. Heading numbers
correspond to steps outlined in Fig. 1.
Identify species
The first phase of a response is to confirm that a new
organism (any species that has not previously been
in New Zealand) has indeed been detected. The
incursion response protocol is triggered when we
receive notification that a suspected new organism
has been found. Information on the organism is
collected, including a description of the organism
and the location of the infestation to enable follow-
up if required.
Accurate identification of invasive species is
fundamental to our ability to respond rapidly to new
introductions (Meyerson & Reaser 2002; Hewitt et
al. 2004). The invasive northern Pacific seastar,
Asterias amurensis, was misidentified in Tasmania,
Australia as a native species for nearly 10 years. By
the time it was correctly identified the population had
exploded to pest proportions (Goggin 1998). The
Ministry of Fisheries maintains contracts for rapid
diagnosis of suspected new organisms. Some species
may require further taxonomic investigation,
although lack of taxonomic certainty does not
preclude a response where it is justified. Cryptogenic
species (species that are not demonstrably native or
introduced; sensu Carlton 1996) are problematic for
biosecurity managers, particularly in the marine
environment where native biodiversity is poorly
described. The status of many species remains
uncertain (Hewitt 2002). Improved knowledge of
New Zealand’s marine biodiversity and maintenance
of taxonomic capability are essential for effective
biosecurity. Consequently, one of the primary
outcomes of a biosecurity research strategy must be
support for fundamental taxonomic work (Hewitt et
al. 2004).
Establish nature and magnitude of problem
The second step is to establish the nature and magni-
tude of the incursion including an initial assessment
of the potential risk the species poses. If an organism
is confirmed as a new introduction to New Zealand,
the CTO-MB will clarify whether it is already an
Unwanted Organism under the Biosecurity Act.
Unwanted Organisms are those species that “the
Chief Technical Officer believes are capable or
potentially capable of causing unwanted harm to any
natural and physical resources or human health”
(Biosecurity Act 1993). Unwanted Organism status
enables a wide range of powers in the Biosecurity
Act to be used to manage the organism. A response
may still be undertaken even if a species is not
determined an Unwanted Organism.
If it is not already an Unwanted Organism, the
CTO-MB will undertake a preliminary risk assess-
ment based on available information. Based on this
assessment, the CTO-MB will decide whether the
incursion warrants establishing a technical advisory
group to provide independent advice on relevant
scientific, operational, and community issues drawn
from experts within New Zealand and overseas.
Technical advisory groups can be established in
advance of species’ arrival in New Zealand, and have
been used to identify likely response actions for
species with known impacts. A delimitation and
environmental survey may be conducted to establish
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Fig. 1 Decision tree used when responding to non-indigenous organism incursions in New Zealand’s marine envi-
ronment. Although the diagram shows key decisions and activities occurring in sequence, in practice some of these
activities may occur simultaneously. (TAG, Technical Advisory Group.)
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the distribution of the organism. A delimitation
survey may not be appropriate where the organism
is already known to be widespread, is benign in
nature, or is unlikely to have a significant impact.
The organism’s potential for further spread, both by
natural means and associated with human vectors,
is also assessed.
A technical advisory group may contribute to a
risk assessment of the organism using any additional
information that has been collected in the interim.
The CTO-MB may decide to determine the species
an Unwanted Organism on the basis of this assess-
ment. We have developed incursion response risk
assessment guidelines based on recognised environ-
mental risk management standards (Standards
Australia/Standards New Zealand 1999, 2000). The
Ministry of Fisheries Marine Biosecurity Risk
Management Framework (RMF) establishes the
context for this risk assessment (Cox unpubl. data).
The first step in the risk analysis is to determine
the likelihood of an impact occurring if the incursion
is left untreated. The likelihood analysis takes into
account the potential distribution and abundance
(both spatially and temporally) of the organism in
New Zealand. This is based on the assumption that
the more widespread an introduced species is, and
the greater its abundance, the more likely it is to have
adverse effects. The analysis considers the character-
istics of both the organism and the recipient environ-
ment when determining the potential distribution and
abundance of the introduced species in New Zealand.
These include temperature and salinity tolerances,
habitat requirements (e.g., depth, substrate, wave
exposure), natural and human-mediated dispersal
capabilities, fecundity, availability of vacant niches
(e.g., paucity of taxonomic or ecological equiva-
lents), and presence of potential natural predators,
parasites, herbivores, or pathogens.
The impact analysis determines the potential
effects of the introduced species on the four core
values identified in the RMF (healthy environment,
vibrant commerce, strong communities, and high
quality recreation; Cox unpubl. data). An example
of the qualitative measures of impact on a healthy
environment is presented in Table 1. Each of the four
values is assigned a level of impact based on the
invasive potential of the species (e.g., the repro-
ductive, dispersal, and establishment capabilities,
growth rate, previous history of invasiveness, and
whether closely related taxa are invasive).
In practice, it is usually difficult to determine the
potential impact that a particular non-indigenous
species will have. Biological invasions involve
complex ecological interactions with outcomes that
are often unpredictable (Ruiz et al. 1997; Ross et al.
2003). Biosecurity managers frequently have to
make decisions based on incomplete biological
information. To recognise this dilemma explicitly,
the risk assessment process assigns scores that reflect
the degree of certainty in the level of impact.
The level of risk is evaluated for each of the core
values by combining the likelihood with the impact
and comparing it to predetermined categories. If the
CTO-MB determines that the species potentially
poses an unacceptable risk, the response proceeds to
the next phase.
Determine appropriate response
A response may range from providing stakeholders
with information and monitoring the event through
to commencing a full-scale containment, manage-
ment, or eradication programme. Management options
may include slowing the spread of the organism or
actively managing established populations.
Containment, management, or eradication responses
are most likely where sustained cost-effective action
Table 1 Qualitative measures of impact on a healthy environment.
Descriptor Example Level
Catastrophic Ecosystem collapse 5
Major Major observable changes in ecosystem level processes, species interactions,
and community structure, including changes in habitat, species composition,
productivity, abundance, and distribution 4
Moderate Observable changes in natural community structure and species interactions
although the effects are manageable with significant effort 3
Minor Limited observable changes in natural community structure and species
interactions and the effects are manageable with low effort 2
Insignificant Natural community apparently unaltered except for the addition of the
non-indigenous species 1
557Wotton & Hewitt—NZ management of marine incursions
is possible, and the organism poses an unacceptable
risk (as determined using the risk assessment
guidelines). The actual level of response will depend
on: (1) potential impacts of the organism on the
environment, economy, and people; (2) technical
feasibility of response options; (3) ability to target
the invasive species; (4) risks associated with the
treatment; (5) the degree of special public concern
or interest; and (6) likelihood of the organism being
eradicated or effectively managed (Biosecurity
Council unpubl. policy).
In some circumstances, immediate containment
or other management actions may be necessary while
decisions are made on eradication or longer-term
management. If the CTO-MB considers (based on
the assessment of risk and available options) that
further management actions are warranted, the
response proceeds to the next phase. Communication
of decisions to stakeholders are a final aspect of this
stage.
Develop and implement plan
At this stage a response plan is developed, in
consultation with stakeholders. Stakeholder input to
both an assessment of response options and the
development of a response plan is critical, especially
when conflicting values exist. Tensions are
sometimes inevitable between the need for rapid
decisions and the need for adequate information
(Biosecurity Council 2003) and consultation.
Response plans vary depending on both the
species and the selected response option. A plan may
include vector management, population control or
eradication, and research. All plans contain a com-
munication strategy to facilitate effective consul-
tation with relevant stakeholders. The plan is
implemented with appropriate monitoring and review.
Monitor and review
Monitoring and review are essential both during and
after an incursion response. Response plans need to
be sufficiently flexible to adapt to unexpected
situations or to be reviewed and refined on the basis
of new information. To ensure success, eradication
programmes must monitor for any individuals
missed by the treatment(s) for long enough to ensure
all individuals have been eradicated.
The frequency and duration of monitoring will
vary depending on the organism. For example, the
Ministry of Fisheries recently completed a response
to the invasive seaweed Undaria pinnatifida in
which monitoring was undertaken every 30 days for
3 years. This was based on the rapid maturity of
Undaria sporophytes (after 40 days) and a maximum
known gametophyte dormancy period of two years
(Wotton et al. in press).
An overall review of the response is also con-
ducted upon its completion. A substantial debrief
with the response team and any advisory and liaison
groups is carried out and recorded to aid in future
decision-making.
The initial response is complete when one or more
of the following applies: diagnosis confirms that the
organism is indigenous; the organism is non-
indigenous, but unwanted organism status is not
warranted; a delimiting and/or environmental survey
has been completed to confirm the apparent and
potential distribution and abundance of the organism;
no further response action is required or practicable (for
example, where the organism has been eradicated, or
initial actions prove ineffective and there is no
practicable alternative, or no suitable response options
are available); and/or sufficient arrangements are in
place to sustain an appropriate level of response until
decisions about a longer-term response are made
(Biosecurity Council unpubl. policy).
Prevent reinvasion
Preventing reinvasion is essential to the success of
any eradication programme (Myers et al. 2000). An
investigation of the organism’s introduction pathway
into New Zealand is undertaken. Where the findings
of the investigation indicate that it is appropriate, the
CTO-MB can require border or other risk-
management measures to be adjusted to mitigate the
risks of repeat incursions. New Zealand’s marine
biosecurity border control measures tend to be broad-
brush approaches that aim to reduce all accidental
introductions. Species-specific refinements to these
controls may not be practical. However, long-term
marine bioinvasion patterns can indicate where new
or improved border controls are required. We are
assessing the effectiveness of our border controls by
establishing baselines of what species are already
here and undertaking ongoing monitoring to detect
new introductions.
UNWANTED ORGANISM
RAPID RESPONSE PLANS
Surveillance and response programmes need to be
designed to target the greatest threats. We are
developing rapid response plans for Unwanted
Organisms not currently present in New Zealand.
The plans will outline the operational requirements
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to respond to incursions of high-risk species. Plans
will identify any available control methods, equip-
ment required, and contain a list of relevant scientific
and technical experts. They will also include infor-
mation on the species’ invasion history, biology,
distribution, and potential vectors.
With the help of New Zealand scientists, the
Ministry of Fisheries identified the following six
species that pose a significant threat to New Zealand:
Asterias amurensis (northern Pacific seastar),
Caulerpa taxifolia, Carcinus maenas (European
shore or green crab), Eriocheir sinensis (Chinese
mitten crab), Potamocorbula amurensis (Asian
clam), and Sabella spallanzanii (Mediterranean
fanworm). The criteria used to identify these species
included a history of introduction in other countries,
links to a current invasion vector acting in New
Zealand, suitable environmental conditions in New
Zealand for the species survival, and demonstrated
ecological, economic, or social impacts. The CTO-
MB determined these species Unwanted Organisms
under the Biosecurity Act in 2000. They were also
included in the Biosecurity Act Notifiable
Organisms Order 2002. This list of threat species was
initially developed for a public surveillance network
and will be refined as more information becomes
available.
Incursion response preparation is closely linked
to surveillance. The Ministry of Fisheries has estab-
lished a marine biosecurity surveillance programme
using a risk-based approach. Surveillance efforts are
targeted at the highest risk pathways, species, and
areas. We are undertaking active surveillance for the
above six Unwanted Organisms, initially focusing
on eight harbours with a high risk of incursion.
CONCLUSIONS
Although responding to non-indigenous species
incursions is difficult in the marine environment, a
response can still be effective with appropriate
planning and tools. The Ministry of Fisheries has
established a transparent incursion response process
that is consistent with other biosecurity agencies and
the Biosecurity Council Policy (Biosecurity Council
unpubl. policy). Recognising that marine biosecurity
is limited in both capacity and capability, the
emphasis must be on early detection and the
development of tools for rapid identification and
response.
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ADDENDUM
As part of the Biosecurity Strategy Implementation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry has been
identified as the lead agency for biosecurity delivery in central government, and marine biosecurity func-
tions have been transferred from the Ministry of Fisheries.

